and puzzle solving as exemplar-based rather than explicitly rule-based. And Alexander Bird (2005, p. 101) holds that the core idea of the paradigm is not the paradigm as 'disciplinary matrix', but the paradigm as exemplar. Kuhn describes the paradigm as an accepted example of actual scientific practice, which provides a model from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. But the coherence displayed by the research tradition, says Kuhn (1996, p. 17) , may not imply even the existence of a full set of rules that additional historical or philosophical investigation might uncover. Kuhn developed these ideas in the early sixties, but later shied away from his untimely account of the methodology of scientific research -untimely, because at that time the prevalent ideas in philosophy and science considered the underlying structure of reasoning as a matter of following rules. Kuhn was, therefore, not able to support his claim empirically (Nickles 2000; Bird 2005) . Recent developments in artificial intelligence and psycho-linguistics, however, support the importance of pattern-recognition, analogical reasoning and case-bound-reasoning in thinking. 1 Since these forms of reasoning are learned through practice with exemplars, Kuhn's claim that scientific research is lead by exemplars seems worthwhile to be reassessed. For legal methodology, the importance of exemplary reasoning might serve as a fresh starting point to reevaluate the role of rules and deductive logic, which some scholars consider to be prerequisite in the production of genuine legal knowledge. 2 The role of exemplars in legal reasoning and theory might also shed light on the alleged distinction between 'fact' and 'value'. If scientific research is lead by exemplars rather than by subject-independent facts, then the truth of scientific theories is based, at least in part, upon values -for the acceptance of an exemplar is an act of faith to some extent, guided by the expectation of the fruitfulness of the theory or the acceptance of the authority of the teacher. 3 The upshot of these introductory remarks is that the concept of 'method' is much broader than the set of explicit methodological rules by which our theories are formally justified and accepted. Part of the legal methodology are non-algorithmic practices, like pattern-recognition and the comparison of similarities and differences, as well as processes of imitation and initiation. The noun 'method' in this journal's title thus comprises both the methodological practices of the scientific community and the processes that are prevalent in teaching. This seems most appropriate for a journal that aims to reflect on legal science as well as education in law. 
